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NGO Legitimacy
Reassessing Democracy, Accountability and Transparency

Non-governmental organizations (“NGO”)1 have enjoyed an unprecedented
amount of influence on national as well as international fronts for the past couple of
decades. A recent survey reveals educated Americans and Europeans trust NGOs more
than they trust governments, corporations, and the media.2 Some scholars suggest that
“[t]he rise of the nonprofit sector may well prove to be as significant a development of
the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was of the latter nineteenth
century.”3 As their power augments, NGOs have become increasingly skeptical and
critical of the power held by the United Nations (“UN”) and by sovereign states. NGOs
accuse these world powers of engaging in rule-making processes that are lacking in
transparency, democracy, and accountability, thus lacking in legitimacy. Now, even as
their power grows, NGOs are falling under this same criticism—NGO processes are far
from transparent, democratic and accountable, and as a result, some claim they are not
1

There is a debate about what NGOs should be called. Some believe that the “non” in NGO is negative,
defining NGOs only by what they are not—not part of the government. Some are opting to include NGOs
with other not-for profit organizations (such as unions) and refer to the more general grouping as civil
society organizations. For discussions on this topic, see SUSTAINABILITY, NGOS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: IN
THE MARKET FOR CHANGE, 13 (2d. ed. 2003). Available for download at
<http://www.sustainability.com/insight/research-article.asp?id=51>; Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 1
8 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 185-86 (1997). In this
paper I will use the widely-used term “NGO.”
2
Eric Pfanner, NGOs gain confidence of public, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (Jan. 24, 2004),
reprinted in CIVIL SOCIETY OBSERVER, Jan./Feb. 2005 (available at: http://www.unngls.org/cso/cso6/ngos.htm).
3
LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR 115 (1996).
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legitimate representatives of the masses. This NGO criticism has increased in frequency
and volume. Even staunch NGO supporters, such as Kofi Annan, have begun to question
NGOs lack of accountability following the NGOs’ participation at the World Conference
Against Racism in Durban, South Africa.
NGO authority flows from public perception that NGOs are legitimate—that they
somehow do represent the muffled masses, that their motives are good, and that they
sacrifice their own comfort to help others. The fallacy of these perceptions can be
demonstrated. But more important are the criticisms regarding democracy, transparency,
and accountability. Democracy, transparency, and accountability go to the core of
legitimacy, they shed light on power structures, they can illuminate bias and self-interest.
But do they fit in a NGO framework? Should NGOs be held to the same standards of
democracy, transparency, and accountability as nation states? Or is there something
inherently different about NGOs that would or should exempt them from the rules of the
game for nation states and inter-governmental organizations? Is the lack of democratic
processes, transparency, and accountability undermining the power of the NGO
movement, or is the lack thereof allowing for the vitality and rapid growth of it?
I will begin the debate with an anemic history of NGOs followed by the
somewhat recent vociferous criticisms of NGOs, focusing on their lack of democracy,
transparency, and accountability. Following which, I will discuss the benefit of NGOs as
they currently exist in an attempt to put in perspective and refute, at least in part, these
criticisms. I hope to demonstrate that although most NGOs do lack strong grasps on
democracy, transparency, and accountability, implementing these concepts completely
would not be beneficial for the NGO movement. Democracy works well in nation states,
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but the same type of democracy would not work for NGOs as they are, and should be,
inherently different from nation states. Therefore, I propose that depending on the NGO
activity, NGOs will need to espouse democracy, transparency, and accountability to
differing degrees. I suggest that the main place where a NGO’s level of democracy,
transparency, and accountability matters most is when they are attempting to influence
policy, whether at the international or national level. When discussing the international
arena in this work, I will focus on NGO involvement at the United Nations.
PART I. THE BEGINNING OF THE NGO MOVEMENT
A. DEFINITION OF NGO
Before we delve into criticisms and compliments of NGOs, we should agree on
what an NGO is, as it means different things for different people. In its broadest sense, a
NGO is an organization that is not part of the government, but is part of the space
between government and private life, known as civil society. Definitions of a NGO
generally include the following elements: promotes a public interest and is not for profit,
engages in non-violent actions, founded by private individuals, is independent of the
state, and follows a minimal organizational structure.4 NGOs, sometimes equated with
special interest groups at the national level,5 can promote a single issue or their interests
can encompass entire ideologies, such as human rights, sustainable development, or
humanitarian aid. The majority of NGOs focus on economic and human development,
human rights, and environmental protection, and humanitarian aid, though NGOs that
4

THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.N.
SYSTEM 2-5 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996); Stephen Hobb, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly
Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 191, 194 (1997). See
also, Martin A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights System, 28 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 307, 310, 314 n. 16 (1997) (explaining the various requirements and definitions
for NGOs).
5
CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 2.
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provide health services, legal assistance and other services are also well known.6 NGOs
can act locally or internationally and can be as small as a single member (sometimes
referred to as briefcase NGOs), or their membership can tally as many as a million
members.7 Some NGOs are huge organizations, with budgets larger than those of small
states,8 that wield powerful influence in international and domestic communities. Large
NGOs attract huge funding, and their visibility in media, the policy-making arena, and
the general public has never been higher.9 Other NGOs possess little power, are
financially unstable, and are oppressed by their national governments. Despite the
difference in size, power, funding, and mandate, a common feature among many NGOs
(especially human rights and development NGOs) is their desire and attempt to influence
government policy, whether at the local, national, or international level.
B. HISTORY—PRE 1945
Although it was not until after World War II that many NGOs came into
existence, NGOs were formed as far back as the eighteenth century.10 Some of the first
NGOs were created to influence national laws that allowed slavery.11 Anti-slavery NGOs

6

For a typology of NGOs, see Debora Spar & James Dail, Essays: The Democratic Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations: Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in NonGovernmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 74-75 (2002).
7
In 1999, Amnesty International counted more than a million members in 160 countries. HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 947
(2000).
8
For a listing of NGOs and their annual budgets, see <www.NGOwatch.org>. Some of the major
international NGOs have budgets of $500 million. See also ROBERTA COHEN & FRANCIS M. DENG,
MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 188 (1998). See also Spar and Dail,
supra note 6, at 171-72; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 7, at 947.
9
NGOS, STATES AND DONORS: TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT? 3 (David Hulme & Michael Edwards eds.,
1997).
10
For a thorough discussion on the early history of NGOs, see Charnovitz, supra note 1.
11
Karsten Nowrot, Symposium, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization: Legal Consequences of
Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 579, 582 (1999); Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 192. The Pennsylvania Society for Promoting
the Abolition of Slavery was created in 1775.
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promoted and organized the International Anti-Slavery Conference in 1840,12 which was
said to be “perhaps the first transnational moral entrepreneur—religious movements
aside—to play a significant role in world politics generally and in the evolution of a
global prohibition regime specifically.”13 Close on the heels of the anti- slavery NGOs, a
Swiss citizen, responding to the brutality toward the wounded soldiers of the Italian wars,
created the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.14 Just a year later, the
NGO Red Cross was instrumental in obtaining the signatures of European states on the
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field.15 By 1900, 425 peace societies existed worldwide.16
Despite NGOs’ involvement in international affairs, the Covenant of the League
of Nations of 1919 did not create official rules for the participation of NGOs in League
business.17 However, the lack of formal recognition and rules for NGO involvement did
not discourage international NGOs from participating in League conferences and in
lobbying League delegates.18 The League permitted NGOs to present papers in some
committees as well as propose language for documents and resolutions.19

12

Nowrot, supra note 11, at 584.
Charnovitz,supra note 1, at 192 (quoting Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The
Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 495 (1990)).
14
Nowrot, supra note 11, at 584; Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 200-01.
15
Nowrot, supra note 11, at 584; Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 200-01.
16
Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 193.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 585.
13
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C. HISTORY—POST 1945
Many of the NGOs that emerged after World War I and World War II were
primarily engaged in relief work in Europe.20 Eventually, relief efforts extended into
poverty stricken third-world countries, and relief eventually flowed into development
projects.21 With the idea of state sovereignty changing after World War II, the drafters of
the UN Charter included a provision allowing the Economic and Social Council
(“ECOSOC”) to establish an official relationship with NGOs; this provision is embodied
in Article 71.22 NGOs worked under the direction of the UN in addressing human rights
abuses.23 It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that NGOs began to focus on
environmental issues instead of human rights. The UN acknowledged that since the 1992
Earth Summit, NGOs have played a significant role in influencing the agenda and
outcome of world conferences dealing with the environment, human rights, women’s
rights, children’s issues, and population.24 An organization that has kept a registrar of
international NGOs since its inception in 1909, the Union of International Associations in
Brussels, counted a slim 176 international NGOs in 1909 and a prodigious 5,936 in
2002.25 A United Nations Development Program study estimates 37,000 NGOs
worldwide.26 The UN has granted some 3,000 non-profit groups (some of which are
local or national NGOs) consultative status with ECOSOC or association with the UN

20

JOHN CLARK, DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS 29 (1991).
Some examples of these early relief organizations are Save the Children Fund, Catholic Relief Services,
American Relief Everywhere. Id.
21
Id.
22
Olz, supra note 4, at 310.
23
Id. at 258-61; Nowrot, supra note 11, at 585.
24
UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE, DSG/SM/38 (Dec. 3, 1998).
25
Kerstin Martens, Examining the Non-Status of NGOs in International Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG.
STUD. 1, 4 (2003).
26
Global Policy Forum, Credibility and Legitimacy of NGOs, available at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/credindx.htm> (last visited May 3, 2005).
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Department of Public Information.27 NGOs have become business savvy and politically
attuned to know how best to promote their causes, be awarded projects from donors and
states, and to receive the ever-necessary funding for the survival of the NGOs. And
NGOs have become big business with their global worth being estimated at one trillion
dollars annually.28
UN Secretary-Generals have even lauded the benefits of NGOs. Boutros BoutrosGhali, the previous Secretary-General said he was “convinced that NGOs have an
important role to play in the achievement of the ideal established by the Charter of the
United Nations: the maintenance and establishment of peace.”29 The current SecretaryGeneral, Kofi Annan, envisions a greater role for NGOs at the UN: “We aspire to a
United Nations that recognizes, and joins in partnership with, an ever more robust global
civil society …,”30 “…peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships
involving governments, international organizations, the business community, and civil
society.”31
From the lofty heights of alabaster pedestals, NGOs have fallen from grace, or at
least slipped a bit. Some scholars, internationalists, and individuals in business and trade
questioned NGO’s representative role following the WTO protests in Seattle, Washington
in 1999.
The increasing clout of NGOs, respectable and not so respectable, raises
an important question: who elected Oxfam, or, for that matter, the League
27

COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, THE MILLENNIUM YEAR AND THE REFORM PROCESS (1999) (on
file with author).
28
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 2.
29
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Foreword in NGOS, THE UN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8 (Thomas G. Weiss &
Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
30
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, address to the 52nd Session of the General Assembly (Sept. 22,
1997).
31
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, address to the World Economic Forum (Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 31,
1998).
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for a Revolutionary Communist International? Bodies such as these are,
to varying degrees, extorting admissions of fault from law-abiding
companies and changes in policy from democratically elected
governments. They may claim to be acting in the interests of the people –
but then so do the objects of their criticism, governments and the despised
international institutions. In the West, governments and their agencies are,
in the end, accountable to voters. Who holds the activists accountable?32
But it was not until the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa
(“WCAR”) in September 2001—where NGOs engaged in bullying of other NGOs and
employed racists hate language to de-legitimize NGOs contradicting their views—that
NGOs fell from grace, even within the UN system.33
At Durban, seven thousand NGO representatives participated in the NGO forum
held August 28 through 31, 2001, the week prior to the WCAR.34 In the areas of
transparency, accountability, and democracy, the Racism Conference represents a low
point for NGOs. This lack of transparency and democracy was most apparent in the
creation of the NGO Document that the NGOs prepared during the NGO Forum to
deliver to the states in an effort to influence the language in the official UN document.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, refused to recommend
and deliver the NGO document to the states, her first and only refusal of this kind.35
Millions of dollars were spent to fund the drafting of this NGO document, but what was
produced was a piece of writing that even NGOs admit was not compiled in a democratic,
32

THE ECONOMIST 129 (Sept. 23, 2000).
See Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism,
26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1 (2002); Gay McDougall, The Durban Racism Conference Revisited: The
World Conference Against Racism: Through a Wider Lens, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 135 (2002); NGO
Monitor, Review of Congressional Investigation against Ford Foundation (Vol. 2, No. 4, Dec. 2003)
<www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n04/v2no4-2.htm> (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); ICARE, WCAR, The
Morning After – October 2001 <http://www.icare.to/wcar/> (last visited May 3, 2005).
34
International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (March 21, 2002)
<http://www.hri.ca/racism/>. The author was one of those seven thousand NGO representatives in
attendance and witnessed first hand the undemocratic NGO process at the Racism Conference.
35
High Commissioner Forced to Turn Declaration Down, HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURES, Sept. 6, 2001, at A1;
Robert E. Sullivan, Many NGOs Came, Few Agreed, CONFERENCE NEWS DAILY, Sept. 6, 2001, at 3.
33
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transparent, and accountable process.36 As one NGO reported, “The adoption of the
NGO declaration was hardly democratic.”37 As a result, Central European, Eastern
European, Asian, and large international NGOs as well as the Roma and Sinti caucus, the
Jewish caucus as well as many others walked out of the NGO negotiations and adoption
process for the declaration.38 Additionally, even though the declaration is said to
represent the NGOs’ views, NGOs never voted and agreed on the declaration.39 Some
NGOs said that the NGO declaration was “hijacked” by special-interest groups and that
the declaration was filled with hateful and anti-Semitic statements.40 In addition, NGOs
reported that the International Steering Committee41 and SANGOCO (the South African
NGO Committee)42 helped pro-Palestinian groups introduce their hateful language
included in the NGO declaration.43 Thus, not only were individual NGOs undemocratic

36

See High Commissioner, supra note 35; Sullivan, supra note 35 at 3; ICARE, supra note 33, at section
entitled The Adoption of the NGO Declaration and Program of Action.
37
ICARE, supra note 33, at section entitled The Adoption of the NGO Declaration and Program of Action.
38
See id.; High Commissioner, supra note 35; Sullivan, supra note 35, at 3.
39
See ICARE, supra note 33.
40
Id. “People who did not agree with the hate-language in the Declaration and who wanted to say
something about that were shouted down. People who tried to criticise [sic] anything were made suspect
‘You are a Jew, your body language betrays you! You are a GONGO!’ (Government Organised [sic]
NGO). Lots of people left in tears or in disgust.” Id.
41
The International Steering Committee (“ISC”) is organized by the Committee of NGOs (“CONGO”), a
part of the UN. It is to be an aid to NGOs who do not have extensive experience with UN procedures. The
ISC is in charge of drafting the NGO document. CONGO, Letter of invitation to Human Rights Internet
NGO to join the ISC, available online at <http://www.hri.ca/racism/background/icc.htm> (last visited
October 2004). See also, Note Concerning the Establishment of an International Coordinating Committee
(April 2001) <http://www.hri.ca/racism/background/icc.shtml> (giving some similar information regarding
the ISC).
42
The South African NGO Committee was organized specifically for the World Conference Against
Racism. Its purpose is to help in the organization and coordination of the thousands of NGOs present at the
Racism PrepComs and Conference.
43
See ICARE, supra note 33. “You could say that the Palestinian NGOs at the WCAR did their work, they
pushed their cause as it is the mission of NGOs to do that. They were highly effective but went over the
top. So much so that damage was done. Damage to their reputation, damage to the democratic process and
damage to the NGO forum itself. Not to speak of the damage done to the antiracism community at large.
Antisemitism [sic] against, -and intimidation of anyone who was thought to be Jewish, friendly to Jews or
member of a Jewish organisation [sic] ran wild. It was a hijack and we all let ourselves be hijacked, some
even fully assisted the hijackers. Some ISC and Sangoco members even did that. Lots of important issues
did not get the attention they deserved or were just not heard at all. The great majority of the International
Steering Committee did nothing to stop all this. Those who tried were overruled.” Id.
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and nontransparent, but so were the international organizations that were created to teach
NGOs the negotiation and document creation process. There was no organization or
system that could hold NGOs accountable for their actions at WCAR.
In the aftermath of the Durban debacle, the UN has reconsidered the role NGOs
should have at the international lobbying and policy-making level.44 Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, who had been a strong supporter of NGO inclusion at the UN, changed his
rhetoric following Durban and has since called for a “pause” in NGO involvement to
reassess their proper role.45 The UN has since held panel discussions and authored
reports to examine the appropriate role of NGOs at the UN and to determine the quantity
and quality of NGO presence and participation at UN events, conferences, meetings, and
general sessions.46 The outcome of these panels reaffirm the state-membership base of
the UN and that only member states can participate in decision making, but they also call
for the continuation and streamlining of NGO involvement.47
Interestingly, there has been talk at the UN about ceasing to hold the now-famous
large world conferences that focus on various themes. Several reasons have been
supplied: these world conferences drain the resources of the UN, the process is unfair in
that only well-funded NGOs can afford to send representatives to them because they are

44

See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, United Nations High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society: Civil Society
and Global Governance (June 2003); UN System and Civil Society—An Inventory and Analysis of
Practices, Background Paper for the Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations
Relations with Civil Society (May 2003).
45
See Annan, 52nd Session, supra note 30; Annan, World Economic Forum supra note 31; Cardoso, Civil
Society and Global Governance, supra note 33.
46
See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, paper presented at UN High
Level Panel, United Nations, New York (June 2-3, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/cardosopaper13june.htm; Panel of Eminent Persons on United NationsCivil Society Relations, A/58/817 (June 21, 2004); Report of the Secretary-General in response to the
report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, A/59/354 (Sept. 13,
2004).
47
See sources in footnote 46.
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often held far from most NGO headquarters, all the important topics48 have been
discussed and there is no longer a need for the large conferences to energize civil society
and governments. Although these reasons are all valid, I question whether an unstated
reason might be that the NGO process was becoming unwieldy due to numbers and
financial resources, and a result of this unwieldiness was the undemocratic and nonlegitimate actions at the Racism Conference.
I believe another example of marginalizing NGOs was the last-minute decision to
incorporate Beijing+10 (the ten-year review of the commitments undertaken at the Fourth
World Conference on Women at Beijing in 1995), which was scheduled to take place the
summer of 2005, into the 49th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women that
was held in February and March 2005. The dissemination was poor of the information
regarding this substantial date change, and because of the last-minute changes, I imagine
many NGO representatives were not able to rearrange their schedules to attend.
In the following section, I will consider some NGO imperfections and the reasons
for which many members of the international community are suggesting a reassessment
of NGOs—their structure, their activities, their influence, and their purpose in the
international community. These recent critiques often come from individuals who are
part of the NGO movement, who have made their careers in NGOs, who believe in the
good of NGOs and are not trying to destroy them. When presenting a variation of this
paper at a conference in Malaysia, an audience member from a NGO asked why I was
picking on NGOs when the real evildoers are the transnational corporations. I repeat my
48

The UN world conferences treated the following themes: children’s rights (1990, New York City);
environmental concerns (1992, Rio de Janeiro); human rights (1993, Vienna); population and development
(1994, Cairo); women’s rights (1995, Beijing, this was the fourth world conference on women’s rights);
social development (1995, Copenhagen); adequate food supply and agriculture (1996, Rome); sustainable
development (1997, New York City); racism and intolerance (2001, Durban).
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response to emphasize an important point of this paper: the critiques I supply from others
and those I make on my own behalf are made with the purpose to ultimately strengthen
NGOs. An entity cannot improve without first knowing its strengths and its weaknesses.
Once NGOs recognize their weaknesses, they can address them and improve their
legitimacy.
Following a discussion of the current criticisms of NGOs, I will explore their
benefits, for surely the world is a better place with them. With the good and the bad of
NGOs spread before me, I will conduct my own reassessment of NGOs, and I will
attempt to determine to what extent NGOs need to be democratic, transparent, and
accountable and where they need to apply indicators of legitimacy. These indicators of
legitimacy will directly affect the quantity and quality of NGOs’ involvement in the
international realm.
PART II. A CURRENT EVALUATION OF NGOS
A. THE CRITICISMS ROLL IN
The media portrays positive stories about the great work that NGOs
accomplish, while muffling the criticism offered by government officials
in developing countries that the “continued propagation of the [benefits of]
NGO[s] [is a] ‘myth.’”49

Some scholars and politicians greatest critique of NGOs is their lack of
transparency, accountability, and democracy, thus their lack of legitimacy. “The
operations of NGOs are at times decidedly opaque. NGOs, acting individually and in
networks, often wield influence on decision-making ‘behind closed doors’ and without

49

TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT?, supra note 9, at 4.
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pluralistic participation.”50 Other scholars believe the power and influence of at least
some powerful NGOs need to be limited “by an international legal framework in order to
provide for some form of accountability in cases of possible NGO irresponsibility.” 51
1. Democracy
While NGOs developed a reputation for the advocacy of the
disenfranchised, some find it ironic that NGO leaders exert tremendous,
almost arbitrary, power over their members. Many observers have
wondered whether NGOs—most of which are Western-oriented—act as
true representatives of larger constituencies, or whether they serve as
political platforms for a few executives.52
NGOs are continuously criticized, by opponents and supporters alike, for their
lack of democracy. Democracy can mean two things. Initially, it examines whether the
NGO follows internal democratic processes, such as a membership base, elections for
board members, and consensus on projects and issues. Next, an accusation of nondemocracy questions the representative nature of the NGO, whether it properly acts as a
legitimate voice for individuals in societies, whether these individuals agree with the
statements and mandates of the organization, and whether the NGO has any way of
knowing whether citizens of countries the NGO tries to influence agree with the NGO’s
position on issues. These two parts of democracy often go hand in hand, but it is
important to distinguish what is being criticized when accusations fly. As such, I will
discuss these two points separately.

50

Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of
Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335, 1372-73 (1999).
51
Nowrot, supra note 11, at 598.
52
Saladin Al-Jurf, Symposium, Part Two: Citizens, National Governments, and International Financial
Institutions: Changing Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
175, 175 (1999).
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a) Internal Democratic Processes
Many NGOs do not adhere to an internal democratic process.53 And many, if not
most NGOs, do not vote on their leaders, the policies and platforms often do not
represent the interests of the members, and few members know what NGO leaders are
doing. Few NGOs follow a democratically created constitution, few are accountable to
their members, and few allow members to vote on initiatives and leaders.54 “Most NGO
leaders, who are not elected by the members, enjoy broad discretion concerning the
policies to be pursued and with what level of vigor.”55 Conversely, some NGOs and
leaders are more representative and responsive to their members, such as Amnesty
International and the Sierra Club.56 Often, however, it is the larger, well-established
NGOs who are just as undemocratic in their internal and external processes as the
smaller, newer NGOs. NGOs who have enjoyed consultative status with the UN for the
past ten to twenty years tend to be the least likely to be democratic in the sense that their
policies and platforms are based on the opinions and concerns of a “well-defined
constituency.” 57
b) Representative Nature
Not only do most NGOs lack an internal democratic process, but many NGOs
purport to speak for the masses, thus claiming some sort of representative nature beyond

53

See generally, Robert Archer, Deserving Trust: Issues of Accountability for Human Rights NGOs, Draft
Consultation, for International Council on Human Rights Policy (April 2003) (available at
<www.ichrp.org>).
54
See Wendy Schoener, Note, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Global Activism: Legal and
Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 537, 550 (1997); Mertus, Legal Transplants, supra
note 50, at 1372.
55
Nowrot, supra note 11, at 601.
56
See Schoener, supra note 54, at 538; Nowrot, supra note 11, at 601; Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions, THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 45, 51 (Winter 1995).
57
Mertus, Legal Transplants, supra note 50, at 1373-74.
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their NGO employees or members. Professor Peter Uvin states, “[m]ost of these
supposed [civil society organizations] are small professional organizations, typically
almost entirely funded by donors.”58 He then asks, “[i]n whose names do they speak?
How do we know they represent the public interest? How do we know that they are not
explicitly positioning themselves in highly political ways?”59
As one author described the problem, “[m]any NGOs, lacking any base in the
local population and with their money coming from outside, simply try to impose their
ideas without debate. For example, they often work to promote women’s or children’s
interests as defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social
disruption on the ground.”60 In the name of women, though not having been elected by
them, NGOs speak out against religion, patriarchy, and traditional forms of sex
discrimination. In the name of children, who are not consulted, and even if they were,
one might question their ability to make informed choices for their present and future,
they lobby for rights to education, safety, and for rights against their parents. In the name
of the poor, they devise plans for economic development and create projects to improve
the lives of the impoverished. It is unquestionable that many of the rights pushed by
NGOs are beneficial, but there are always some “rights” that are hotly contested and not
representative of the desires of the majority of members in some affected societies.
Although I again reiterate that that NGOs should not function in a completely democratic
manner when promoting rights, it is important to question whether their definition of
rights is too far off from the societal definition of rights upon which the NGO definitions
would be imposed. Some countries and individuals who are experiencing the imposition
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of rights and policy on them are not pleased. Many of the so-called beneficiaries of these
NGO projects and lobbying efforts ask, “To the degree that NGOs seem like conveyors
of the global civic-mindedness, on what basis do they purport to understand, let alone
embody, the global public interest?”61 These so-called beneficiaries, almost always from
the global South, and Southern scholars levy claims of cultural imperialism, paternalism,
and insensitivity toward historical, cultural, and religious differences.
The North-South split is an important, subtle, and yet pervasive manner in which
NGOs are not representatively democratic.62 Although NGOs claim to represent the
oppressed, “many powerful NGOs come from a small minority of advanced industrial
states, and NGO views are often far from reflective of the public at large.”63 World
constituencies do not vote for NGO representatives, nor do they vote on the agendas they
want their NGOs to advance. Thus, NGOs seem to contradict “the most basic rule of
democracy, namely, to govern with the consent of the governed.” 64
Not only are almost all of the well-funded and powerful NGOs from the global
North, but they also fund projects in the global South. But it is the Northern NGOs who
almost always create the project, and it is the Southern NGOs who conform their NGOs
to fit the project criteria. One reason Northern NGOs generally garner greater
international influence is their larger budgets, greater access to resources, ease of
accessing the media, and affordable technology.65 Larger Northern NGOs attract the
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greatest donor funding.66 About fifty of the roughly 2,000 Northern NGOs control as
much as eighty percent of NGO resources.67
This dominion of ideas occurs not just in developing countries but also at the UN.
“A complication within the NGO community is that Northern NGOs continue to
dominate agenda setting at the United Nations with Southern NGOs underrepresented.
This highlights the need to bridge the North-South divisions that continue to hinder
intergovernmental operations.”68 One example of this agenda setting at the UN is the
influence in determining when the Beijing+10 Conference would be held and what kind
of format would be used to discuss relevant issues. Just a few weeks after Beijing+10,
held in February and March 2005, an NGO activist stated it was a last minute decision to
hold the Beijing+10 Conference in conjunction with the 49th Session of the Commission
on the Status of Women instead of in the summer of 2005, when it had been scheduled,
and that the decision to not re-opening the text of the Beijing Document, which was done
at the Beijing+5 Conference, for further elaboration and discussion was made because
“we” did not think it was the right time to reopen the document because of the present
conservative administration in the United States.69 A smart tactical move, but who is this
“we”? Is it all NGOs who wanted to attend Beijing+10? All earth’s citizens, who
arguably the document can eventually affect? All women’s rights NGOs? Or just a pre-
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selected group of like-minded NGOs who agree with the positions supported by this
single NGO? From where did this single NGO get the power and authority to represent
“we” and change dates and decide what should or should not be open to discussion at an
UN conference? Was a vote taken from all interested NGOs? Such undemocratic
agenda-setting is what prompts human rights activists, government officials, normal
citizens, and other NGOs to question the legitimacy (the democracy, the transparency, the
accountability) of such NGOs.
Another problem that the North-South split creates is the North’s tendency to set
the agenda for the South, without understanding the society, culture, politics and other
issues that affect human rights and development. This Northern control “simply
perpetuates structural Southern underdevelopment and dependency.”70 Instead of looking
to their people and resources to create sustainable development, Southern NGOs become
dependent on outside funding from the North that is tied to Northern ideology.71 Because
Northern NGOs and donors mandate projects and methods in exchange for funding,
Southern NGOs tend to adhere to this agenda to acquire needed monies.72 For example,
one Southern NGO manager explained how she was engaged in a project on girl child
labor, but when she heard a Northern NGO was giving funding to a program focused on
HIV/AIDS, she dropped her labor program to create an HIV/AIDS program to obtain the
funding.73 This Southern NGO leader expressed a desire to have an equal relationship
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with Northern NGOs so Southern NGOs could discuss the real needs of their people
instead of just following the mandates of Westerners.74
A 1995 survey of NGOs showed that 76 percent felt that large NGOs dominated
issues; 75 percent believed that English-language run NGOs dominated; and 71 percent
felt that Northern NGOs dominated. 75 It is interesting to note that these percentages are
very similar, perhaps because Northern NGOs tend to be the larger, English speaking
NGOs. Due to the power and wealth of Northern NGOs, some Southern NGOs perceive
Northern NGOs as perpetuating their culture and beliefs, which Southern NGOs do not
necessarily agree with or want in their society.76 Some consider Northern NGOs as being
prejudiced, racist, sexist, and agents of colonialism.77 Until groups are represented
equally and fairly, democracy in civil society cannot move forward.78 Southern NGOs
complain that international NGOs, almost exclusively funded by donors in the North, are
active “in parts of the world that are little consulted about their own priorities and toward
which INGOs have no accountability.”79
But the North-South split is not the only area of concern for representation.
NGOs, especially women’s NGOs, are often criticized of promoting an agenda set by
educated, middle and upper class. A smaller grassroots Bolivian NGO that works with
rural, poor, indigenous women complained about larger, well-funded women’s NGOs
that are filled with middle and upper class women. The grassroots NGO declared that the
larger women’s organizations only represented the interests of the middle and upper class
74
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women, despite their claims to represent the poor, rural, indigenous Bolivian women.80
She asserted that these middle and upper class women did not know the concerns of the
indigenous woman as they were far removed from the situation, physically, culturally,
and educationally.81 Not only are they separated culturally and economically, but she
claimed she had never seen an indigenous woman in their NGOs, meaning they did not
even make serious efforts to understand the indigenous woman.82 NGO and governmentNGO actors from Bolivia’s middle and upper class supported her critique of a lack of real
representation of the woman and other minorities.83
2. Elitism and Professionalism – Who Do They Represent?
A criticism that incorporates both democracy and accountability issues is the
growing elitism and professionalism in the NGO movement.84 Critics argue NGO
professionals have lost touch with the uneducated poor they claim to represent.85 In other
words, they do not represent the powerless and voiceless because they themselves are not
voiceless and powerless, and many never were. Professionalism is not in itself bad, in
fact, education and training help NGO members better understand the contentious issues
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before them, the workings of international law and systems, effective lobbying, best
practices of aid and services distribution, and how to effect change. And with positions
at large, well-known NGOs being competitive, NGOs can choose la crème de la crème.
But professionalism also means that their personal interests will often reflect the societal
class to which they belong, the middle or upper class. It also means that they often will
not understand the intended beneficiaries, especially if they are poor, uneducated, and
from the global South. It must also be acknowledged that each paid professional at an
NGO has a vested interest in the continuation, even aggrandizement of the NGO
movement and the continuation of their projects. This critique can be made of
politicians, of civil servants, international civil servants active in government agencies,
international governmental organizations, international tribunals, and other areas of
practice.
From the viewpoint of a scholar from the global South, the aspects of
professionalism present in NGOs is problematic because these professionals represent
their own interests, rather than the interests of those the policies will affect and rather
than being servants to the poor and oppressed, as the media packages them,86 these
professionals become the privileged in society.87 “Many human rights professionals
come from elite backgrounds. More often than not, the leading human rights activists in
any country belong to a privileged class or social group. This is particularly true in
86
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resource-poor environments, where the human rights field has become something of a
last-chance business--and may represent one of the few sectors where paid, professional
jobs are still available.”88 This describes the situation in Bolivia where the human rights
and development NGO activists, supported by international funding, form a part of the
Bolivian elite.89 These NGO employees can be found in the best restaurants on any day
of the week.
With increased funding comes better wages and job security for NGO employees.
With better wages comes increased competition for positions in NGOs, and increased
competition generally means better-qualified candidates with significant education and/or
experience. This all leads to increased professionalism, which is generally positive,
however, as NGO employees become increasingly professional, they will need to devise
ways that keep them in dialogue and understanding of the people they represent or the
people who will be affected by the policies they promulgate, their “clients.” Significant
time should be spent among these clients to understand their concerns, their desires, and
consider their proposals for improvements. Of course not every employee of an NGO
would have to dedicate significant time to connecting with these clients, but NGOs
should determine the necessary number of client servicers depending on numbers and
types of projects.
Elitism is more difficult to address. It exists in the global North and the global
South. In the North it is not necessarily the wealthy or best educated or most
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internationally connected who fill NGOs, but NGO employees tend to come from the
same group of people who shuffle back and forth from NGO to NGO, sometimes with
stints in government or intergovernment agencies. In the global South, employees of top
NGOs tend to be the wealthier, better educated, and internationally connected. “With
media-driven visibility and a lifestyle to match, the leaders of these initiatives enjoy
privilege and comfort, and progressively grow distant from a life of struggle.”90 In other
words, the leaders of Southern NGOs become increasingly like their Northern
counterparts and no longer “represent” or understand the people whose life they are
trying to improve.
It is difficult to address elitism in the North because as employees gain experience
at NGOs, they become better qualified for additional projects at the same or other NGOs.
This same issue exists in the South. Donors and Northern NGO funders could purposely
seek out newer or smaller Southern NGOs, but a concern might be the amount of
experience and skill they have compared to the seasoned NGOs. As with
professionalism, elitism is not totally bad—experience and connections are beneficial.
To combat the negative aspects of elitism (such as lack of ingenuity or insincerity of
activists concern for the issue), NGOs should gradually begin to incorporate new
employees, new projects, or new NGO partners. This will benefit the global NGO
movement because new employees and projects will introduce new ideas and
perspectives into sometimes-stagnant approaches to issues. And partnering with new or
less experienced NGOs will act as a training ground with a view to strengthening smaller,
often grassroots NGOs.
3. Is Democracy Necessary for NGO Legitimacy?
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The West has taught the world well that democracy is of fundamental importance.
And critics of NGOs who attack their undemocratic methods seem to be equating NGOs
with government—that it is vital that both work in the same manner. These critics forget
that many institutions that they likely submit themselves to are not democratic, nor do we
expect them to be democratic—religious institutions, private educational institutions,
public and private companies, and some international quasi-governmental organizations.
Although each of these organizations might have some amount of internal democratic
processes, in none are they purely democratic in that they necessarily represent the
desires of the masses.
It is worth examining the purpose of democracy and whether the objective of
NGOs would be better served by conforming to that process. Democracy is designed to
enable members of society to elect government representatives who are to act according
to the will of their constituents. Democracy functions by majority rule, which means that
there is little protection within the structure for minority voices. NGOs—human rights
more than humanitarian and development NGOs—exist in large part to give voice to the
voiceless minority. If NGOs begin to strictly follow democratic processes of formal
representation among the world’s masses, which is what the criticism that they are too
liberal implies, they would likely become significantly more conservative and cease to
demand what some societies would see as progressive changes in the treatment of
women, children, racial minorities, homosexuals, and the oppressed generally. In fact,
had early NGOs in the United States simply acted according to the desires of the masses,
they would not have lobbied to ban slavery, pushed for women’s emancipation, or race
equality in the form of civil rights. In these cases, the minority voice did not represent
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the average person or the majority of persons, but we now all agree that what they did
was good and necessary. Indeed, it seems that if NGOs simply reflect the voice of the
democratic majority, their raison d’être is void, at least if they already exist in a
democratic society. Where the majority individuals are already represented, in theory, by
a democratic government, there would be little benefit from a civil society that also
represents the majority views.
Additionally, the cost of generating a membership base and securing formal
representation of the masses is expensive, and therefore unattainable for many smaller
NGOs.91 Many present-day NGOs continue the practice of working to obtain rights for
the voiceless and powerless, despite no formal election from the masses to do so. But the
undemocratic criticism is not without merit. Elitism in the NGO movement and wealthy
Northern donors “buying” opinions and constituents through their selective funding,
whether consciously or unconsciously, has led Southern NGOs and scholars to denounce
the NGO movement as a means of cultural imperialism. Thus, although internal
democratic procedures and formal representation of the world masses might not be
possible—or even desirable—for NGOs, they should be held accountable for their claims
of representation. These claims are usually made when attempting to affect law or policy
or when seeking funding; they are made to bolster the legitimacy of the NGO and tend to
be self-serving. These claims should be examined by the person receiving the claim,
whether that be a policy-maker or a donor. One need not use a complicated equation to
determine representation. A simple investigation into the nature of the NGO, the breadth
of the claim, whether there is a membership base or some other connection with members
91

UVIN, 90-120. See generally, International Council on Human Rights Policy, DESERVING TRUST: ISSUES
OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS (Draft Report for Consultation, April 2003) (focusing on
credibility, accountability, and legitimacy, but arguing democracy is not as important for NGO legitimacy).

25

of society, whether the NGO has goodwill in the sectors of society it claims to represent,
the breadth of its funding, and so on.
4. Transparency and Accountability
In addition to requiring a minimum of accountability to claimed representation, to
bolster NGO legitimacy and improve NGO functioning, NGO funding and mandates
should be transparent. I will review arguments addressing and methods of enforcing
accountability and transparency.
Some of the basic problems of NGOs, such as their sources of funding, their
allegiances of loyalty, and the discriminatory North-South split enhance NGOs’ lack of
transparency and accountability. “[W]ell-financed western NGOs are likely to have more
power than their poorer and non-western counterparts, and the lack of transparency and
accountability in transnational civil society is likely to keep this power unchecked.” 92
Scholars have insisted that NGOs become transparent, showing who has the power and
how they use that power. 93 Sources of funding should also be divulged. Scholars
counsel that for a healthy global power structure, more than pluralism and representation
are needed; transparency is necessary to assure that all actors—governmental and nongovernmental—behave responsibly and ethically.94
a) Tunnel Vision
One aspect of accountability is the responsible representation of issues and
problems in the global community. Because NGOs are special interest groups, they can
willingly ignore the “big picture” as they are more interested in their narrow objectives
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that are tied to donor funding.95 This tunnel vision causes NGOs to focus on pet topics
and ignore the broader social, political, and economic contexts.96 Such a narrow
approach can harm the society as a whole and can inhibit long-term success because it
ignores policy and political trade-offs and the wider context in which decisions must be
made.97
NGOs have ignored requests for specific help and given the perspective
beneficiaries what the NGO think they need instead. One NGO in Africa recognized that
women were a critical part of cultivating, selling, and processing crops, yet the Northern
NGO created a development project teaching women how to make pottery instead of
helping them become better farmers.98 An Asian NGO ignored input from women that
their traditional role included agriculture and taught them instead sewing.99 But tunnel
vision has been even more destructive—some NGOs worsen situations by ignoring the
implications of their do-gooder actions. For example, well known accounts abound about
NGOs buying slaves their freedom, which of course encourages those who profit from
slave sales to continue or even increase their participation in this practice. Humanitarian
NGOs are sometimes criticized for providing aid and medical services to both sides of a
conflict, which can actually extend the conflict as the warring factions have no need to
care for their own soldiers or for the citizens. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali encouraged NGOs to take the time to consider “the political complexity of
any peacekeeping operation” before taking sides and trying to solve the problems.100
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Additionally, perhaps due to a philosophy that little lies are justified when they
are used to promote what NGOs view as a worthy cause. NGOs have allegedly engaged
in unethical practices, including incidents of irresponsibility and academic dishonesty in
NGO position papers and background papers.101 Instead of simply pushing their agenda,
NGOs need to focus on the greater good and on constructive outcomes rather than selfpromotion.102
b) To Whom Does Accountability Flow?
Accountability is a difficult issue to promote and develop among NGOs because it
is unclear to whom NGOs should be accountable and how that accountability should
occur.103 In fact, not everyone agrees that NGOs should be required to be accountable to
donors or members or intended beneficiaries.104 Without determining the order of
accountability, NGOs need to be accountable to three separate groups:
employees/volunteers/members, donors, and intended beneficiaries.
To begin, perhaps where accountability should be easiest, I will begin with
accountability to those who support the NGO—the employees, volunteers, and members.
NGOs need to follow through on projects that they undertake, they need to secure
resources so employees and volunteers can perform their research, lobbying, and
fieldwork effectively. They need to inform employees, volunteers, and members of
changes in institutional focus and purpose. And they need to ensure that their projects
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actually accomplish what they intend for them to accomplish. This last task also goes
toward accountability to donors and intended beneficiaries. Although many donors
require some accountability, as discussed below, NGOs should create their own
customized internal accountability mechanisms. Humanitarian aid agencies did this of
their own volition following their failure in the Rwanda genocide and their unknown aid
to the actors of the genocide by providing them, as well as well as the victims, with food,
shelter, and rest, and a recruiting ground.105 These internal accountability mechanisms
would have to be constructed in such a way that they did not take scarce resources away
from projects. Instead of creating elaborate requirements to count every benefit or flaw,
it might be more useful to determine prior to each project the elements that make a
difference for that specific project and monitor them.106
Next, NGOs need to be accountable to their donors. Donors often give funding
based on specific projects and intended results. Donors should establish and implement
effective reporting and monitoring systems that respect NGOs’ autonomy while
simultaneously ensuring that funding is being used for the intended project and that
projects are actually being developed and implemented and that results are visible. Most
donors already require various levels of accountability. This measuring of NGO project
success can be difficult and could push NGOs to create shorter-term projects with easily
verifiable results.107 Care and sensitivity should be exercised when donors create
accountability requirements. But despite the sensitive nature of measuring success, real
forms of accountability must be required. This is especially necessary in developing
countries where thousands of NGOs are created because it is seen as a lucrative career.
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Financial accountability is necessary in countries where the local population lacks trust in
NGOs because NGOs are perceived, whether true or not, as pocketing part of the money
intended for local projects.108 NGO founders and employees are often the wealthier
members of their societies, adding to the distrust and perception of misuse of NGO
funding.109
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, NGOs need to be accountable to the
intended beneficiaries of their efforts. This entails creating projects that will produce
long-term benefits, not just immediate and short-term responses to durational problems.
This is a common challenge among development NGOs. “Projects tend to be small, last
for ridiculously short periods of time, are devoid of any serious long-term vision, are not
transparent in their criteria for support, and are strongly influenced by remote
headquarters in the West. They are administratively heavy and costly, with large delays
between identification and actual implementation, offer little flexibility, and contain weak
monitoring and evaluation systems.”110 In order to understand the needs of their intended
beneficiaries and to improve their projects, ActionAid, a nonprofit organization that
spends millions of dollars annually to combat hunger and poverty, completely
reorganized its accountability mechanisms to focus on the opinions of its intended
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beneficiaries.111 Rather than organizing accountability from the perspective of those
implementing the projects, they interview those benefiting from the project to know what
they are doing well and what needs to be modified.112 Others criticize a model of
accountability based solely on the perception of the beneficiaries.113 As usual, a middleroad approach seems best—something that collects and considers the beneficiaries’
opinions and incorporates some of the tried and proven indicators of project success and
accountability.
5. Transparency in Funding
There is an increasing tendency of NGOs to rely on governments for funding,
which can ultimately compromise the very attributes that make NGOs desirable—
“independence and freedom of action.”114 Development NGOs receive the majority of
their funding from the government—from sixty-six percent for American NGOs to
between eighty and ninety-five percent for Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Kenyan, and
Nepalese development NGOs.115 Although development NGOs have historically
received the vast majority of funding from governments, more human rights NGOs are
being funded by states and intergovernmental organizations. Even the UN subsidizes
some human rights NGOs to facilitate their participation.116 Specifically, it funded many
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NGOs so they could attend the Racism Conference.117 One possible reason for this
subsidization was to enable the attendance of under-funded Southern NGOs so they could
share their experiences and wisdom. However, by choosing which NGOs to subsidize,
the UN can influence the ideology presented at the conferences.118 As NGOs compete
for UN sponsorship, NGOs will likely tailor their programs to reflect UN ideology,
whether they believe it or not. Although UN sponsorship is not necessarily negative,
steps should be taken to ensure sponsorship includes a wide range of NGOs with
disparate views, especially if the views represent a large section of a population, even if
that view is contrary to one taken by the UN. One possible method would be for
Southern NGOs whose annual budges is less than a certain level and who are interested
in attending UN conferences and meetings to enter a lottery. Once an NGO is chosen, it
will be taken out of the lottery for the remainder of the year. This would ensure
participation for Southern NGOs who would not be able to attend without the UN
assistance, but ensures that no politics or ideology will influence the selection process.
Private funding is also problematic. One scholar and long-time actor in
development projects described donors as “carving up the territory into their own
fiefdoms.”119 The likelihood of NGOs engaging in independent thought and action is
drastically reduced as governments and private donors choose to distribute funds to those
NGOs that reflect the donor’s ideology.120 “The pressure on local NGOs is thus
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enormous to mimic donor behavior and rhetoric.”121 Simply put, “as NGOs get closer to
donors they become more like donors.”122 Hundreds of thousands of Southern NGOs
chase after pieces of the $50 billion development aid that is available on an annual basis
that is controlled and channeled through the large Northern NGOs and international
organizations that are part of the UN.123 Not only does this result in conformity of
projects, it also creates contention and rivalry among NGOs that leads to an
unwillingness to work with each other by pooling resources and ideas.124 “Despite their
best attempts at operating in a fair manner, local NGOs may be funded beyond their
capacity for good management. Common problems include NGOs censuring their own
members, attacking other NGOs viewed as competitors, and blocking all but a few
privileged elites from participating in their operations.”125
Another problem with funding is the power that is associated with large, wellfunded NGOs. Though there is a drastic difference in the power and resources of a large
NGO and a small NGO, this is rarely discussed as important when considering NGO
participation at the UN. “There is little incentive for powerful NGOs to recognize this
misbalance, and less powerful groups can be so marginalized that their protests are not
heard.”126 Thus, large NGOs—which are often Northern, Western, and liberal—
dominate international discussions and set the agenda at UN conferences and meetings.
The incentive structure of NGOs is such that choosing topics and spinning events
into a story that catches big headlines is beneficial to NGOs. “Name recognition, just as
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in the business world, has real financial value. Foundation grants, private individual
donations, and government subsidies come with notoriety.”127 And of course, with
limited donors and funding comes increased competition between NGOs to grab the
biggest headlines and receive the most funding.128 This can lead to exaggerated claims of
wrongdoing or simply an unfair amount of press on a single issue at the expense of other
more pressing issues.
Partnerships, which might or might not directly include funding, also need to be
transparent. Environmental NGOs who seek to limit the hazards of contaminating
factories in developing countries partner with labor organizations who lobby against
these same factories, but for a different reason, because they are worried about wage
competition from these developing countries.129 And NGOs against genetically modified
organisms in agricultural crops are known to partner with organic farmers and organic
food grocery store chains and foreign companies who do not want to compete against US
agriculture imports.130 Although NGOs might partner up with other organizations and
corporations that might seem in harmony with their mandates, one might wonder at what
point the partners in the partnership begin to influence or manipulate the other. Although
I do not believe we should inhibit these partnerships, they should be public knowledge in
order for outsiders to better understand the organization and its many interests and
possible influences.
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6. The Old and New—Systems of Accountability and Transparency
Systems of accountability and transparency need to be conceived of, created, and
implemented to combat the abuse of authority that is assumed will eventually occur
where power accumulates. The power itself needs to become accountable and
transparent.131
a) At the United Nations
At the international level, it makes sense for the UN to institute some sort of
monitoring or accountability mechanism for NGOs seeking to enjoy access to the UN, its
conferences and meetings, and the member state delegates. Presently, NGOs who want
to enjoy these privileges simply need to be accredited by the Economic and Social
Council (“ECOSOC”). The accreditation process can be lengthy, but it is not
complicated. NGO accreditation is based on Article 71132 of the UN Charter and
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. ECOSOC requires that all accredited NGOs shall “be of
recognized standing within the particular field of its competence or of a representative
character,”133 write a democratically elected constitution and have a representative body
to make policy,134 have a representative structure and “possess appropriate mechanisms
of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and
actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and
transparent decision-making processes,”135 and any government funding shall be reported
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to ECOSOC.136 International NGOs are not considered for ECOSOC accreditation unless
they are “of a representative character and of recognized international standing; it shall
represent a substantial proportion and express the views of major sections of the
population or of the organized persons within the particular field of competence,
covering, where possible, a substantial number of countries in different regions of the
world.”137
The requirements for ECOSOC accreditation include some elements designed to
ensure a certain level of democracy and representation, but they are only weakly, if ever,
applied. Once an NGO is accredited, the review process is more like an automatic
renewal process than an actual examination of the original requirements for accreditation.
This is not surprising considering the lack of resources to monitor the thousands of NGOs
who currently hold ECOSOC accreditation. The UN is not able to monitor NGOs’
democracy, accountability, and transparency, so the systems for ensuring them will have
to come elsewhere or the UN will have to secure funding to undertake serious review
processes.
One available option that would keep monitoring of UN-active NGOs in
ECOSOC would be to require ECOSOC accredited NGOs to pay an annual fee that
would offset the cost of investigation for the new ECOSOC applications and reviews of
existing accredited NGOs. And instead of trying to review every NGO, a set number of
NGOs should be randomly selected for a review, and this number should not exceed a
number that would allow for a serious review of the NGOs’ democratic processes,
representative nature or expertise in a field, transparency of funding and partnerships, and
136
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internal and external accountability mechanisms. These additional areas of transparency
and accountability would need to be incorporated into the application requirements for
NGOs. The reviews should be conducted by small panels, say of three persons from
varying countries, to limit the possible political nature of the accreditation process.
A disadvantage to such a system is that is would burden the Southern and smaller
NGOs who already have less of a voice at the UN. This problem could be easily
addressed, however, by granting exemptions to NGOs with annual budgets less than a
chosen amount. Another concern could be that requiring even the medium and larger
NGOs to pay an annual membership fee could chill NGO involvement at the UN.
Although this is possible, it could have a secondary beneficial effect of encouraging at
least many of the smaller and medium NGOs to combine permanent caucuses to act on
their behalf at the UN. This way, only the caucus would have to pay the membership fee
and the review would be of the caucus and not the individual NGOs. This could, in the
long run, improve smaller NGOs access to the UN and could strengthen their voices
collectively. A danger is that some of the minority voices will be quieted in the process.
However, if an NGO is passionate about a topic and its views are being quieted, it could
seek special short-term or conference specific membership. In such cases, the NGO
could pay the application fee that would include a free one-year membership.
b) Ideas Within Sectors
Additional systems of accountability can exist at the international and domestic
arenas. These secondary mechanisms would be especially important for NGOs who do
not directly participate in the UN. Various NGO actors and scholars have suggested
ameliorative changes for systems of accountability and transparency, especially regarding
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funding. Professor Peter Uvin suggests the entire donor funding system needs to be
modified—the disparity of funding between the well-connected and the grassroots needs
to be eliminated, funding from foreign donors needs to be pooled so NGOs do not feel
pressure to conform to donor ideology, and the funding needs to be predictable so NGOs
can create long-term projects instead of changing projects every six months to chase
funding supporting the latest concern as chosen by the West.138 Although in theory his
pooling idea is interesting and could produce significant changes, in practice, few donors
will agree to surrender their influence that is tied to their funding.
Ideologically similar NGOs—such as development, educational, human rights. .
.—could create their own codes of conduct that include control mechanisms regarding
democracy, transparency, and accountability. Various NGO sectors have already
engaged in such practices and have seen some benefit. Humanitarian NGOs have created
a Code of Conduct, a Humanitarian Charter, and other tools to aid their efforts of
accountability.139 And The International Council on Human Rights Policy prepared a
160-page report examining the manners in which human rights NGOs can effectuate
changes to encourage increased accountability, which included action from donors,
governments, and the NGOs themselves.140
c) Caution in Accountability Mechanisms
In our zeal to improve accountability and transparency, we should ensure that new
systems of accountability and transparency do not simultaneously create barriers to the
functioning of unpopular NGOs. While discussing NGOs, democracy, accountability,
and transparency at a conference in Malaysia, Malay NGO members were pleased to
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report that Malay NGOs are required by law to hold elections for officers, report on
funding and spending, and open their financial records for review.141 Without knowing
more, this law seems beneficial as it requires NGOs to be democratic, accountable, and
transparent. However, this same law acts to deny NGOs the state does not approve of
from obtaining a legal status, which is necessary for NGOs to organize and function in
Malaysia. If governmental bodies create and implement law, whether at the international
or national level, as a means of ensuring accountability and transparency of NGOs,
protective measures should also be included in the law to ensure evenhanded treatment of
NGOs.
B. THE ASSESSMENT OF GOOD
It is easy to criticize NGOs, or any community that grows in power and
prominence. It is especially easy to criticize when NGOs place themselves on the moral
high ground. To be sure, NGOs are imbued with self-interest, their structure and actions
are often undemocratic, and some NGOs are insensitive to culture, religion, and history in
their pursuit of certain “rights” that some societies do not believe are human rights and
therefore should not be protected. But NGOs have also done great good regarding human
rights, focusing on the environment, distributing aid and services, and forcing countries—
rich and poor, North and South—to rethink their policies and actions. The question, then,
is do the benefits of NGOs outweigh their costs? Would the world be a better place
without NGOs? To answer this, we must consider what NGOs do, every day around the
world.
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NGOs influenced world powers at the founding conference for the UN, in 1945,
to include respect for human rights as one of the four purposes of the UN Charter.142
They have since successfully advanced human rights, environment, and population
issues.143 “NGOs have emerged as prime movers on a broad range of global issues,
framing agendas, mobilizing constituencies toward targeted results, and monitoring
compliance as a sort of new world police force.”144 NGO involvement at the Earth
Summit in Rio raised world awareness about the importance of protecting the
environment. The NGO forum at the Women’s Conference in Beijing received more
publicity than the UN Conference. And it was an NGO that held meetings between
warring factions in Mozambique that eventually resulted in a peaceful settlement.145
Besides the above examples of general good NGOs do, NGOs excel in specific
tasks.
1. Distribution
NGOs that focus on providing humanitarian relief and engaging in development
projects often are the main conduits for delivering aid to those in need. And NGOs that
take part in distributing aid comprise a substantial portion of the NGO community.
“At a time of accelerating change, NGOs are quicker than governments to
respond to new demands and opportunities. Internationally, in both the poorest and
richest countries, NGOs, when adequately funded, can outperform government in the
delivery of many public services.”146 NGOs are known for being more flexible,
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possessing community trust, and knowing how best to work with the poorest individuals
who are often in remote locations far from government aid.147 In fact, research has
shown that projects managed and funded by international organizations do not tend to be
sustainable because local communities are not involved.148 The UN has recognized this
NGO advantage and relies heavily on NGOs to distribute aid, especially to the poor in
remote locations. In 1997, NGOs administered eighty percent of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees’ budget.149 Of the $3.5 billion of humanitarian aid funding,
more than seventy-five percent was delivered by NGOs.150 The UN is able to recognize
the problem and quantify the need, but it is NGOs that are familiar with superior channels
of distribution.
2. Expertise
NGOs often focus their attention on a few issues, gather information addressing
these issues, and then disseminate information promoting awareness of them.151 In the
process, NGOs often become experts on these areas. “[L]arger NGOs have evolved to
rival state representatives in their effectiveness on certain issues. … [T]hey can provide
services that supplement intergovernmental resources as well as counterbalance the
reluctance of intergovernmental bodies to monitor politically sensitive domestic state
practices.”152 The UN and country delegates have often looked to NGOs for information
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and advice on specific topics.153 NGOs often contribute their legal and technical
expertise at UN working groups as informal contributors. This “freely offer[ed]
assistance . . .has made them virtually indispensable to the U.N.”154 In one example,
NGOs provided states with information on women’s rights and violence against women
at preparatory meetings for the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights.155 As a
result, the outcome documents of the conference included several pages on women’s
human rights, whereas before the NGO involvement, women were not specifically
mentioned.156
3. Well-funded Groups
Many of the larger NGOs are so well funded that even some governments and the
United Nations envy their well-stocked coffers.157 Some major international NGOs can
boast a budget of $500 million, though this is rare, as even Amnesty International’s
Secretariat’s budget is at $26 million and Human Rights Watch’s budget is $14
million.158 Governments and intergovernmental organizations have a tendency to push
human rights, human development, and aid relief to the rear. NGOs, with their strong
funding, push these items back to the front, where they belong. NGO funding means
resources, and resources mean the ability to do more, from monitoring states’ actions, to
collecting testimonies and information from victims, to creating an infrastructure for the
delivery of aid services to remote locations, to research and policy writing. In short,
NGOs can spend money on those things that governments tend to ignore, or hide.
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Additionally, NGO funding, unlike state funds, are dedicated to a few specific issues,
whereas state funds must be spread over a plethora of issues. Thus, some of these large
NGOs are spending more on human rights, aid delivery, development, or the environment
than certain governments and even the United Nations are spending on them.
The United Nations relies on the annual $8 billion in development and relief
assistance that international NGOs provide, thus “helping to fill the growing gap between
needs for such assistance and the capabilities of the United Nations and other
international and national sources.”159 With limited funding, the UN seems to be looking
more toward NGOs to augment humanitarian assistance, implementation of treaty
obligations, and monitoring of treaty adherence. And large, well-funded NGOs are ready
to use their resources in ways that benefit the UN.160 The UN is not the only party of this
alliance to benefit; partnering with the most known international organization lends
credibility to NGOs and their programs. And increased credibility often means increased
funding.
4. Monitoring
Because NGOs focus on select issues, they are able to monitor governments’
compliance with international accords, compile and disseminate their findings, and
ultimately pressure governments to improve their compliance.161 NGOs have found
success in pressuring governments by waging media campaigns. Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and GreenPeace are well known for their media statements aimed
at governments and private companies demanding changes in present law or
implementation. In a specific example, NGO country monitoring is vital to the
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effectiveness of the Human Rights Commission, the monitoring arm of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights.162 Without NGO monitoring, the Commission
would not be able to question and refute claims of compliance with human rights.163 Due
to a relatively few number of Commission members compared to the number of countries
and the frequency of human rights violations, the Commission would be greatly hindered
without the aid of NGO surveillance.
5. Implementation
Monitoring leads to implementation of the international agreements by the state
signatories. As the secretary-general said after a world conference, “when we all go
home, it will be the NGOs that will continue the pressure on governments.”164 NGOs
push the agendas that governments refrain from pushing due to a lack of political will.
NGOs hold governments accountable to their citizens and to the treaties and conventions
they sign.165 They hold large transnational corporations accountable for their
employment practices, working conditions, and environmental impact. As mentioned,
the UN often lacks resources to confront powerful corporations, and states are sometimes
more interested in obtaining work, even under poor conditions, for their citizens than in
questioning corporate practice and loosing the anticipated revenue from the corporate
presence.
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6. Apolitical
NGOs are independent of governments and apolitical, at least most claim to be.
As such, they can perform tasks in which governments are unable to engage, such as
monitoring, due to political alliances and diplomatic reasons. Because NGOs are viewed
as politically neutral, they can monitor elections, participate in democracy building, and
political party development166 for a functioning multi-party democratic system to operate.
Their apolitical nature also makes it possible for them to play their trump card—naming
and shaming. If NGOs were political, like governments, states and citizens could ignore
the naming and shaming tactics, but because of their neutral political position, NGOs
stand on human rights or development or aid/services distribution principles when they
expose government inaction or miss-action.
7. Giving Voice to the Voiceless
As already stated several times in this paper, NGOs, especially human rights
NGOs, give voice to the voiceless. This is more than just a trope. Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and the American Civil Liberties Union have recently spent
considerable time and resources on the issue of juveniles tried as adults and sentenced to
life in prison without possibility of parole. International and domestic Indian NGOs
condemned the treatment of untouchables and lobbied at international conferences for an
abolition of laws that tolerated such discrimination. NGOs worked with the US and other
states to pressure for change in countries that either legitimize so-called honor killings
and honor crimes with their penal laws or countries who fail to investigate and prosecute
these crimes. NGOs have succeeded in educating the world about the sexism and health
risks inherent in female genital mutilation, and these NGOs have also affected a change
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in this practice in many countries. NGOs fight against slavery and trafficking in women
and children. And NGOs, in partnership with states and international organizations
worked to end apartheid in South Africa. It is often NGOs that give a face to the
suffering and the injustice. It is often the NGOs that mould public opinion and mobilize
the masses.
PART III. REASSESSMENT
A. NOT TOTALLY LACKING IN DEMOCRACY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
We come to the question again of whether the world would be a better place
without NGOs, I believe the resounding answer to this is “no”, the world would not be a
better place. The benefits of NGOs, even the imperfect NGOs we now have, far
outweigh the costs. And as discussed above, many of NGOs’ weaknesses can be
addressed; they are not beyond modifications and change. We should also remember that
most NGOs are young, existing only since the 1970s, only a couple decades old, if that.
According to a UN study, nearly one fifth of the world’s NGOs were formed in the
1990s.167 With youth comes inexperience, so it should not be surprising that NGOs have
made mistakes and have not thought through all ramifications of all of their actions. But
with youth should also come forgiveness for transgressions and second and third chances.
NGOs, their vision and their work, should continue, locally, nationally, and
internationally. But NGO members, governments, and members of the international
organizations should rethink the role of NGOs, the relationship we want NGOs to have
with locals, governments, and international organizations. We must evaluate what each
partner in this sprawling partnership hopes to get out of it. It is easy to criticize NGOs
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because they have made mistakes, innocently and purposefully. But intentions are
generally good; desire to improve lives is sincere.
Again, it is easy to criticize, and some of these criticisms regarding legitimacy—
specifically democracy, transparency, and accountability—matter; others do not.
Legitimacy can exist for NGOs even without complete democratic internal processes.168
In fact, for some human rights NGOs, their legitimacy is not based on representation and
democracy, but “on the trust that others have in them and on the quality and honesty of
their work.”169 The legitimacy of humanitarian NGOs is based in part on their perceived
neutrality and their ability to distribute aid effectively.170 Before believing all criticism of
NGOs, it is necessary to question what makes NGOs effective and whether the
suggestions to improve them would actually harm their effectiveness.
Peter Spiro champions NGOs and refutes the criticism that NGOs are not
representative of large percentages of the population.171 He points out that the voting
system in the United Nations General Assembly does not produce equal representation
between all citizens of the world. States with small populations have an equal vote to
that of China or India, both of whose single vote represents their billion citizens. Spiro
argues that NGOs who have similar very broad goals, like human rights promotion,
collectively speak for the same amount of people as mid-sized states.172
Additionally, legitimacy does not just come from democracy, transparency and
accountability. The goodwill of the public is what gives, in part, legitimacy to NGOs, so
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if public believes NGOs should implement accountability and transparency mechanisms,
they can show that to NGOs by their lack of goodwill and lack of tangible support in the
form of donations, volunteer time and such. Media can criticize NGOs when they
perceive a lack of accountability, which will push NGOs to implement changes.
Although these checks on NGO action are weak and would not effectuate rapid change,
they are available and could be used more effectively. There should, however, be a goal
of a more organized and more effective monitoring system that simultaneously does not
impede NGOs freedom of association or promulgation of ideas. NGOs should be weary
of a government created monitoring system, such as Malaysia’s that acts as a monitor of
ideas under a guise of ensuring democracy, accountability, and transparency.
Also, democracy doesn’t always matter, especially when NGOs do not purport to
speak for the masses, but rather speak or act based on theories of rights, whether they be
economic and social rights that drive development NGOs, or civil and political rights that
almost exclusively drive human rights NGOs.173
B. WHERE DEMOCRACY, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY MATTER:
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
Are most NGOs more transparent, democratic, and accountable than most governments . .
. ? Do those civil society groups based at the UN represent and reflect the whole
spectrum of political views within the member states? If these groups are so
representative, why are they not more successful in influencing the positions of member
state governments? At times it appears . . . that some NGOs seek to achieve at the
international level that which they have failed to attain at the member state level.174

The attack on NGOs’ legitimacy due to their lack of democracy, transparency and
accountability has some solid foundation. But it is also the case that legitimacy is not
only found in these three characteristics. Additionally, due to NGOs’ unique structure
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and methods of advocacy and assistance, democracy might not be beneficial for all
NGOs. But where democracy (both internal democratic processes and representation of
those on whose behalf NGOs purport to speak or who will be affected by the proposed
policies) does matter is at the policy-making levels—both domestically and
internationally. I will focus only on the international level as individual states will need
to customize responses to NGOs acting in their territory.
At the international level, where policy creation is concerned, when NGOs lobby
country delegates and purport to speak for a certain section of the population, NGOs
should be accountable for such statements and there should be a way for state and
intergovernmental actors to easily verify NGO claims of representation. State and
intergovernmental actors should also be able to know sources of NGO funding to
understand possible motives and biases. This openness is not supposed to be designed to
put NGOs at a disadvantage while lobbying, but voting states should be informed about
who is lobbying them, their connections, and their motives.
As discussed above, ECOSOC could improve its monitoring of accredited NGOs.
In addition to the listed requirements for accreditation and the additional suggestions I
made earlier, the following information could be made available regarding all ECOSOC
accredited NGOs, it should be updated periodically, and the list should be easily
accessible on the Internet: NGO statements of representation, opposition or criticism of
the statement of representation, annual budgets, sources of funding, number of employees
and volunteers, and countries in which they engage (not a required category as some
NGOs engaged in projects or partnerships in states with oppressive governments might
be put in danger by divulging such information).
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PART IV. CONCLUSION
We need NGOs. And we need NGOs that are professional, composed of highly
educated and motivated individuals, just as we need the smaller NGOs that are run almost
exclusively by volunteers who have not made a career of NGO work. But NGOs do need
to change, largely because of their ever-increasing power, influence, and involvement in
creating international (and national) policy and law. When NGOs are engaged in policy
and norm creation, they should be held to a higher standard of democracy
(representation), transparency, and accountability. Former UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed his faith in NGOs:
I am convinced that NGOs have an important role to play in the
achievement of the ideal established by the Charter of the United Nations:
the maintenance and establishment of peace. . . . I believe NGOs can
pursue their activities on three fronts. In the search for peace, they must
obtain the means—and we must help them to do so—to engage in
assistance, mobilization, and democratization activities, all at the same
time.175

NGOs do have an important role to play in implementing the UN Charter by monitoring
and exposing countries’ actions. They are also significant actors in the development and
humanitarian aid arena. But for NGOs to be trusted with their newly endowed power and
resources, NGOs must effectively address their weaknesses regarding transparency,
accountability, and to a lesser extent democracy. As they voluntarily tackle these
difficult issues, their power and prestige, and perhaps even resources, will likely increase.
They will become able to participate in greater roles at the international law and policymaking level.176
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Boutros-Ghali, supra note 29, at 8.
Some NGO activists have already called on the UN to grant NGOs a greater role by granting NGOs five
to ten percent of General Assembly seats. See Spiro, supra note 56; Hobb, supra note 4, at 208-09.
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Secretary General Kofi Annan has recently reaffirmed that the UN is an intergovernmental body composed
of member states and that aspect of the UN was not going to change. See Report of the Secretary-General
in response to the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations,
A/59/354, ¶ 3 (Sept. 13, 2004).
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